Meta-argumentation in deliberative discourse: Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21 by Olmos, Paula
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 11 
May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM 
Meta-argumentation in deliberative discourse: Rhetoric 
1360b05-1365b21 
Paula Olmos 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Olmos, Paula, "Meta-argumentation in deliberative discourse: Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21" (2016). OSSA 
Conference Archive. 73. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/73 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International 
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA, 
pp. 1-17. 
Meta-Argumentation in Deliberative Discourse: Rhetoric 1360b 05-
1365b 21 
 
PAULA OLMOS 
Department of Linguistics, Modern Languages, Logic and Philosophy of Science, Theory of Literature and 
Comparative Literature. School of Arts. 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 
c/ Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 1. Ciudad Universitaria de Cantoblanco, 28049, Madrid. 
Spain 
paula.olmos@uam.es 
 
Abstract: Aristotle’s Rhetoric assumes the exceptionable and multidimensional character of the allegations adduced 
as reasons for the conclusions of political (i.e., collective) practical arguments (proposals). This problem has been 
addressed in terms of the incommensurability of value-based argumentation, an approach that seems to lead us to an 
evaluative dead-end. In the Aristotelian text, we find a different tactic. Aristotle analyses how the continuum 
between argument and argument criticism and the meta-argumentative scaling takes place in deliberative discourse. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In his 2013 monograph on meta-argumentation, M. Finocchiaro employs and explores this term 
in order to characterize several common argumentative modes of discourse: from those 
criticizing or opposing arguments in everyday contexts, to the more conscious and explicit 
analytical discussions typical of self-reflective fields such as Philosophy or Science, where, he 
says, “meta-argumentation is prevalent”, culminating with Argumentation Theory itself, as a 
particular way of arguing about argument (p. 1).  
Later in the book, Finnochiaro (2013) discusses different issues currently addressed by 
Argumentation Theory for which a meta-argumentative approach might be useful—or even 
unavoidable—among which the most relevant for my own purposes relates to the problems posed 
by “deep disagreements”. To these he dedicates Chapter 7, stating as that chapter’s conclusion at 
the end of his survey that: “meta-argumentation is one of several effective instruments for 
rationally resolving deep disagreements and fierce standoffs” (Finocchiaro, 2013, p. 243).  
Deep disagreements (Fogelin, 1985) may occur in different fields and for different 
reasons but are characteristic of political and ethical discussions, being related to the peculiarities 
of practical arguments and the problems posed by value-based argumentation. As has been 
claimed by several authors (Kock, 2007; Vega, 2013), in a way that fairly corresponds to 
Aristotle’s treatment of the deliberative or citizens’ assembly genre (genos symbouleutikon) in 
his Rhetoric, political argumentation aims at supporting and justifying the kind of collective 
practical claims called proposals. According to Luis Vega’s account (2013, pp. 2-3), the 
difference between an individual purpose and a collective proposal lays in the further 
commitments assumed by the interlocutors in the latter case. Thus, an individual purpose, 
expressible as “I intend (plan, set out) to do A”, involves two conditions: 
 
(i)  The description of an action or course of action (A) plus 
(ii)  A pro-active attitude towards it, 
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While for a purpose to become a proposal, expressible as “I propose we do A”, we need an 
additional condition: 
 
(iii) An invitation to the interlocutor(s) to share the commitment regarding the 
proposed action.  
 
Moreover, a purpose and the reason(s) supporting it may be entertained at an internal, mental 
level, constituting thus a reasoning process, while a proposal has to be communicated and 
overtly argued for.  
Now, Aristotle similarly assumes that the aim of political argumentation, a public 
discourse genre, is to exhort the assembled people to—or dissuade them from—engaging in 
actions. In fact, when stating his approach to deliberative argumentation and its persuasive goals, 
he employs terms which are different from those he uses in the case of theoretical persuasion or 
pistis. Here (Rhet. 1360b10) he identifies the goals of deliberative argumentation as hai te 
protropai kai hai apotropai, usually translated for “persuasions and dissuasions”, but literally 
conveying “activating and countering motion or action”, i.e., “mobilizing and demobilizing”.   
We’ll see that, according to this setting, Aristotle will have to tackle the same 
complexities modern scholars have encountered when dealing with argumentation about 
proposals. These we may sum up in the following three points: 
a) The obviously gradual (non-plausibly, not even ideally, bivalent) character of the 
terms expressing the correctness attributed to the claims (i.e., the proposals), which are not 
supposed to be justifiable as true or false but as more or less convenient or advisable; a 
characteristic which has to be added to the also gradual and comparative assessment of the 
arguments supporting them—something practical arguments share with theoretical ones. We will 
have to assume that we are dealing with better and worse arguments (not just valid/invalid or 
good/bad arguments) about the greater or lesser convenience of our claims (not about their 
truth/falsity). As Searle (2001) has pointed out, contrary to theoretical and constative claims, 
practical claims have a world-to-word direction of fit. 
b) The usually value-laden character of the grounds supporting the claims which can 
make any process of weighing or balancing of reasons rather difficult. In relation to this problem, 
Kock (2007) makes several terminological precisions which may be usefully recalled: 
 
1. In our modern democratic societies there is legitimate value diversity, that is to 
say, diverse values are in circulation among citizens, and we must admit the prima 
facie reasonableness of dissenting parties1. 
 
2. Moreover, each of us—or each group of coordinated or equally interested 
people—is attached to several values at the same time, which we will try to 
satisfy. Each of us has to live with her value pluralism and take decisions leading 
to various degrees of satisfaction of her different values. We all have experienced 
                                                          
1 That is why Kock (2007) insists that the objective of political (counter)argumentation is not necessarily to show 
the incorrectness or unreasonableness of our opponent’s policies but instead try to expose and clarify our reasons for 
supporting our own proposals in order for an audience of citizens to understand the merits of each and decide for 
themselves. 
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the need to “rank our values”, to establish an order or hierarchy among them in 
order to select a suitable line of action. 
 
 
3. And then we all have seen how difficult this is, because values seem to be 
incommensurable: it is not easy to find common criteria, a “common 
denominator” or “super value”, to base or justify our ranking or hierarchy. Each 
value seems to have its own measure or scale of satisfaction, and the 
multidimensional character of our reality remains insurmountable.  
 
4. A problem which is additionally complicated by the possible material 
incompatibility between ideally complementary actions. We may not be able (not 
even subsequently) to engage in different actions that allegedly would jointly 
reach an optimum of value-satisfaction. In many cases, thus, our decisions require 
that we renounce to one or several of our pluralistic aims, something that is 
directly linked to the third problematic point about arguing for proposals.  
 
c) Argumentation about (political) proposals usually takes place in contexts where either 
the need is collectively felt or there is, in fact, an explicit “institutional” requirement to reach a 
decision, to set a policy, to engage in some action or other. Suspension of judgement is not an 
option. 
Consideration c) forces us to look for some solution to the assessment and decision 
conflicts mentioned by Kock (2007), among other scholars. Incommensurability, incompatibility 
and multidimensionality seem to lead us, though, to an evaluative and dialectical dead-end, 
typical of deep disagreement between different people in a pluralistic society or even within our 
own pluralistic selves. 
In such a quandary, we may opt for a non-argumentative method of decision, like sorts or 
voting, which is not necessarily something unreasonable to do and might be inevitable in the 
long run. But that doesn’t mean that, as argumentation theorists, we have to stop our analysis 
here. Finnochiaro (2013) has suggested that meta-arguing is something we, at least, try to do in 
order to (rationally) overcome such standoffs. And if we take a look at Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
(1360b 05-1365b 21) it seems this was already his idea.  
 
2.  Aristotle on deliberative argumentation  
 
In order to illustrate and discuss the problems of multidimensionality and incommensurability, 
Kock (2006, p. 255) refers to the Rhetoric to Alexander (1421b), mentioning the different (and 
not easily comparable) criteria listed by this ancient rhetorical treatise for supporting the 
eligibility of an action: i.e., that it be either “just”, “lawful”, “expedient”, “noble”, “pleasurable”, 
“easy to accomplish”, or, if difficult “practicable”, or in some way “necessary”. Again, more 
recently, Kock (2012, p. 282) has also made use of the classical status theory to point up similar 
questions. In my opinion, though, Aristotle’s meta-argumentative account in his rhetorical 
treatise is as illustrative of the difficulties faced by the theorist of political argument and much 
subtler about the means real arguers use to overcome them. 
Aristotle does not only take into account what seems to be the first stage of deliberation, 
in which the arguers may chose possibly incompatible practical claims (in material terms) and 
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defend them with reasons based on possibly incommensurable values. He also tries to advance 
(at least a little bit) into the means to break the impasse and continue the discussion by engaging 
in some kind of meta-argumentation. In doing so, he most naturally assumes the debatable, 
exceptionable and multidimensional character of the kind of allegations, adduced as reasons for 
the proposals and for the critical meta-arguments supporting the values involved in their 
selection. 
Aristotle’s text is an enlightening source which carefully analyses how the “continuum 
between argument and argument criticism” (Pinto, 2001) and the meta-argumentative scaling or 
ascent takes place in deliberative discourse (Finocchiaro, 2007; 2013). But it is also an example 
of the insightful fruitfulness of a meta-argumentative approach to tackle many intriguing issues 
within argumentation theory.  
Aristotle dedicates chapters 4-7 of Rhetoric’s Book I to comment on the peculiarities of 
the deliberative or assembly’s speech genre (genos symbouleitikon), starting (1359a 30) with a 
definition and demarcation of the thematic contents of its typical claims: 
 
[a]dvice is limited to those subjects about which we take counsel; and such are all 
those which can naturally be referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose 
origination is in our own power2. [my emphasis] 
 
He makes clear, thus, that he is speaking about human voluntary actions whose advisability 
would be the subject of practical argument. Among the usual topics for deliberation, Aristotle 
mentions the following five: “ways and means, war and peace, the defence of the country, 
imports and exports, legislation.” (1359b 21) whose particulars are the object of political science 
and not of rhetoric. Deliberative rhetoric just starts to care about them insofar as the actions or 
decisions they request become the content of exhortation and dissuasion and only from the 
moment we begin to explore and look for possible grounds to support them in argumentation.  
Aristotle’s first and most straightforward response to this question, that is the question 
about “from which grounds” (ex ōn) to counsel an action, is the allegedly universally shared 
quest for “happiness (eudaimonia) and its component parts”. This aspiration applies both to 
individuals and to communities and might be alleged as grounds to support a proposal in the 
simplest deliberative argument Aristotle contemplates. For such basic pieces of deliberative 
discourse—as the ones represented in the following diagrams—he provides us with an explicit 
multiple warrant, from which a number of usable simple warrants might be extracted: “For one 
should do (dei prattein) the things which procure happiness or one of its parts, or increase 
instead of diminishing it, and avoid doing (mē prattein) those things which destroy or hinder it or 
bring about what is contrary to it” (1360b 11).3 
                                                          
2 Fragments from Aristotle’s Rhetoric are taken from the digital text in Perseus Project 
(http://www.perseus.tufts.edu) that corresponds to J. H. Freese’s English translation for Loeb’s Classical Collection 
(Harvard University Press), first published in 1926. 
3 Here and throughout the paper, I will be using the diagramming system proposed by H. Marraud and used in his 
paper and web publications (e.g., Breve curso de esquemas argumentativos; “El argumento de la depredación”, both 
available at: https://www.academia.edu). The system is based on the basic components of the Toulmin Model, to 
which additional elements and interargumentative relations might be subsequently added. The basic components of a 
simple argument are represented as follows: 
 Data 
Warrant: So 
 Claim 
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 Doing A will bring us happiness (eudaimonia) 
For one should do (dei prattein) the things which 
procure happiness: 
So 
 I propose we do A 
 
 
 Doing A will increase our happiness (eudaimonia) 
For one should do (dei prattein) the things which 
increase happiness: 
So 
 I propose we do A 
 
 
 Doing A will destroy our happiness (eudaimonia) 
For one should avoid doing (mē prattein) those 
things which destroy happiness: 
So 
 I propose we avoid doing A 
 
However, happiness is probably a too abstract (and contentious) end and we usually will be 
aiming at some of its most obvious parts, conditions or means to procure it, which are particular 
goods. Among these, Aristotle mentions noble birth, good friends, wealth, good children, bodily 
excellences, good reputation, good luck or virtue. In such case, our practical or deliberative 
arguments might still be rather simple, requiring just serial argumentation. 
 
 B is part of happiness  
What is part of (or a direct 
experience of) happiness is a 
good: 
So  
 B is a good Doing A will bring us B 
What brings us some good 
should be done: 
So 
 I propose we do A 
 
On the other hand, our proposed actions will only be expedient (sumpheros) and thus advisable if 
they really bring about such goods or, in the limit, if they are a kind of good in themselves, a 
direct experience of happiness (independence and well being).  
Some (admittedly not very clear) words are said here (1362a 30-40) about the 
relationship between means and ends (about what amounts to bringing about, or following or 
resulting in): 
 
Now things follow in two ways—simultaneously or subsequently; for instance, 
knowledge is subsequent to learning, but life is simultaneous with health. Things 
which produce act in three ways; thus, healthiness produces health; and so does 
food; and exercise as a rule. This being laid down, it necessarily follows that the 
acquisition of good things and the loss of evil things are both good; for it follows 
simultaneously on the latter that we are rid of that which is bad, and subsequently 
on the former that we obtain possession of that which is good. (Rhet. 1362a 30-
40) 
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Because our actions are being supported as expedient means for rather obvious and desirable 
ends that, just a little bit later, will be categorized as “generally recognized goods” (ta 
homologoumena: literally things on which there is agreement). And in such a case the only 
disputable element of the argument is the instrumental one (“doing A will bring us B”), which 
could be opposed and therefore, in need of justification. For example in the way shown in the 
following diagram which tries to follow the pattern suggested by Aristotle in the paragraph 
above: 
 
 B is part of happiness A casually originates B 
[or A will make us 
acquire B] 
 
What is part of (or a 
direct experience of) 
happiness is a good: 
So So 
What causally 
originates something is 
a means to obtain it:  
 B is a good Doing A will bring us B  
What brings us some 
good should be done: 
So 
 
 I propose we do A  
 
As we have seen, one of Aristotle’s examples is exercise as a means to obtain health: 
 
 Health is part of 
happiness  
Exercise originates 
health 
 
What is part of (or a 
direct experience of) 
happiness is a good: 
So So 
What causally 
originates something is 
a means to obtain it:  
 Health is a good Doing exercise will 
bring us health 
 
What brings us some 
good should be done: 
So 
 
 I propose we do exercise  
 
It is in direct relation to this particular discussion that Aristotle states that “men deliberate, not 
about the end, but about the means to the end” (1362a 20) not meaning (as has been assumed by 
a long standing tradition) that ends are unquestionable, undisputable or irrationally elected but 
that deliberation is about deciding on actions. Actions are what is at stake in deliberation, what is 
in need of justification, and actions are typically supported as expedient means to chosen ends. 
But, of course, such ends could also be in need of further justification, and precisely most of 
Aristotle’s subsequent discussion is precisely about justifying ends, while very little indeed is 
said here about “instrumental rationality”. 
In Aristotle’s own terms when discussing such a possibility (1362a 31ff), not all goods 
are “generally recognized as such” (ta homologoumena). For those on which we disagree—i.e., 
the disputed ones (ta amphisbētēsima)—we might need more arguments (grounds and warrants) 
not about the means to achieve them but about their alleged goodness. And Aristotle offers us at 
this point (1362a 31-1363b 4) a kind of list of criteria (genre topics or idia, cf. Braet, 2005) from 
which to construe allegations that will act as reasons supporting the goodness of proposed goods 
or ends. This inventory is not at all systematic or exhaustive and it is not easy to reduce it to a list 
of concepts as those offered for similar purposes in the Rhetoric to Alexander to support the 
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eligibility of an action (Kock, 2007). In any case, the inventory bears some relevant features that 
make of it a more sophisticated account of our argumentative resources. 
First of all, Aristotle is very conscious about the merely plausible and exceptionable 
character of most of the grounds and warrants he examines and he freely uses expressions like 
“for the most part”, “as a general rule” (hōs epi to polu) or “speaking generally” (holōs) to 
qualify their applicability:4 
 
That is good the opposite of which is evil, or the opposite of which is 
advantageous to our enemies; for instance, if it is specially advantageous to our 
enemies that we should be cowards, it is clear that courage is specially 
advantageous to the citizens. And, speaking generally, the opposite of what our 
enemies desire or of that in which they rejoice, appears to be advantageous; 
wherefore it was well said: “Of a truth Priam would exult”. This is not always the 
case, but only as a general rule, for there is nothing to prevent one and the same 
thing being sometimes advantageous to two opposite parties; hence it is said that 
misfortune brings men together, when a common danger threatens them.  
(1362a 31-1363b 4) 
 
In fact, with the possible (but still questionable) exception of some quasi-analytical warrants as 
“that is good the opposite of which is evil” (Diagram A), the criteria mentioned by Aristotle, like 
“that is good the opposite of which is advantageous to our enemies” (Diagram B) have a more or 
less evident but also evidently limited range of applicability (see e.g., Diagram C) that makes it 
worth the exploration of exceptions to the rule, or even the direct applicability of the contrary 
rule (Diagram D).5  
 
Diagram A 
 B is the opposite of C, which is 
something evil 
 
That is good the opposite of 
which is evil: 
So  
 B is a good Doing A will bring us B 
What brings us some good 
should be done: 
So 
 I propose we do A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 On the Aristotelian uses of the clause “hōs epi to polu”, see di Piazza (2012). 
5 In the following diagrams (and in those of the next section), I provide the examples of the possible actions finally 
supported by the complex deliberative argumentation which is the explicit object of Aristotle’s discussion, even if 
the author does not refer to them in this part of the text where he focuses on the merits of the criteria employed for 
their justification. 
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Diagram B 
 B is the opposite of C, which is 
advantageous to our enemies 
 
That is good the opposite of 
which is advantageous to our 
enemies: 
So  
 B is a good Doing A will bring us B 
What brings us some good 
should be done: 
So 
 I propose we do A 
 
Diagram C  
 
 Our being courageous is the 
opposite of our being cowards, 
which is advantageous to our 
enemies 
 
That is good the opposite of 
which is advantageous to our 
enemies: 
So  
 Our being courageous is good Listening to Pericles will make 
us courageous 
What brings us some good 
should be done: 
So 
 I propose we listen to Pericles 
 
Diagram D 
 
 Signing a peace treaty would be 
advantageous to both us and our 
enemies 
 
That is good which is 
advantageous to two opposite 
parties: 
so  
 Signing a peace treaty is good Sending an embassy will 
make us sign a peace treaty 
What brings us some good 
should be done: 
So 
 I propose we send an embassy 
 
3.  Aristotle on deliberative meta-argumentation  
 
The next step taken by Aristotle will finally take us to a meta-argumentative stage. Because, 
even in case we agree on the goodness of certain aims (and, accordingly, on the prima facie 
advisability of the actions granting them), we may have to decide on their relative priority.  
As he neatly declares: “But since men often agree that both of two things are useful, but 
dispute which is the more so, we must next speak of the greater good and the more expedient” 
(1363b 5). Such an argumentative situation could be represented by the following diagram in 
which our problem is how to account for the priority expressed by the symbol “greater than” 
(“>”) which expresses the comparison between the strength of two arguments. 
 
PAULA OLMOS 
 
 9 
 B fulfils 
criterion C 
   B’ fulfils 
criterion C’ 
 
That is good 
which 
fulfils 
criterion C: 
So 
 
 
 
So 
That is good 
which fulfils 
criterion C’: 
 B is a good Doing A will 
bring us B 
¿>/<? Doing A’ will 
bring us B’ 
B’ is a good  
What brings 
us some 
good should 
be done: 
So 
 
 
So 
What brings 
us some 
good should 
be done: 
 I propose we do A  I propose we do A’  
 
Accordingly, Aristotle will offer now a new and rather extensive list of criteria (1363b 5-1365b 
19, a new and different type of deliberative idia) for the comparison and hierarchisation or 
ordering of alleged goods as aims justifying actions. With this new inventory, he is trying, in his 
own terms, to give a solution to the problems of incompatibility between A and A’ (as alternative 
actions), multidimensionality between C and C’ (or other goodness-criteria) and alleged 
incommensurability between B and B’, that have already been mentioned.  
The ways to account for our weighing (i.e., to account for “>” or “<”) might be different 
and show various degrees of argumentative complexity. For instance, with one of his typical 
compact expressions, “the greater good and the more expedient”, Aristotle is already talking 
about two very different argumentative possibilities: 
 
a) weighing the goodness of aims B and B’ 
b) weighing the expediency as means of A and A’ 
 
But unfortunately, the ensuing inventory is not then so clearly divided into both strategies. In any 
case, the second possibility would require us to (re)evaluate the instrumental premises (“doing A 
will bring us B” and “doing A’ will bring us B’”), going back to the kind of justification they 
may have in order to weigh their different merits for expediency.  
The first one (which seems to be more in Aristotle’s mind, as he does not really address 
many issues of expediency in this particular text) amounts to comparing the justifying basis of 
premises “B is a good” and “B’ is a good”. Such a comparison would be more clearly 
represented thus: 
 
 B fulfils 
criterion C 
   B’ fulfils 
criterion C’ 
 
That is good 
which 
fulfils 
criterion C: 
So 
 
¿>? 
 
So 
That is good 
which fulfils 
criterion C’: 
 B is a good Doing A will 
bring us B 
 
Doing A’ will 
bring us B’ 
B’ is a good  
What brings 
us some 
good should 
be done: 
So 
 
 
So 
What brings 
us some 
good should 
be done: 
 I propose we do A  I propose we do A’  
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Again, in order to account for “which is the greater good” we might do two things. First, we 
might think of additional criteria, completely different and independent from the ones 
previously adduced as supporting the goodness of our goods that would incline the scale in 
favour of one of the goods over the other.  
 
 B fulfils criterion  D. B’ does not fulfil criterion D  
What fulfils 
criterion D 
is preferable 
to what does 
not: 
So 
 
 B fulfils 
criterion C 
   B’ fulfils 
criterion C’ 
 
That is good 
which fulfils 
criterion C: 
So 
 
>  So 
That is good 
which fulfils 
criterion C’: 
 B is a good Doing A will 
bring us B 
 Doing A’ will 
bring us B’ 
B’ is a good  
What brings 
us some 
good should 
be done: 
So 
 
So 
What brings 
us some 
good should 
be done: 
 I propose we do A  I propose we do A’  
 
 
Some of the criteria (idia) included in Aristotle’s inventory will be typically used in that way. 
Such are those whose lack of fulfilment does not present itself to the author’s mind as in any way 
a plausible reason to support the goodness of an aim. They are, therefore, mentioned as simple 
criteria, with no comment on the possible merits of their “opposite” or “correlate” term. They 
could be used, in the first instance, to support the goodness of an end or meta-argumentatively to 
support its greater goodness over another good. For example, the authority of wise men may 
serve as an additional reason in favour of one good over another:  
 
And that which men of practical wisdom, either all, or more, or the best of them, 
would judge, or have judged, to be a greater good, must necessarily be such, either 
absolutely or in so far as they have judged as men of practical wisdom. (1364b 
12) 
 
But interestingly enough, most of the items in Aristotle’s list are mentioned together with an 
opposite notion that could eventually be adduced as supporting as well the goodness of an aim. 
In such cases, it is conceivable that two different goods would have been initially supported by 
opposite notions. If we want to weigh them against each other, we need warrants that state the 
preferable quality of one criterion over its opposite. And, as we will see, there are warrants 
enough to do that, in one sense or the other (for these are matters in which a qualification “for the 
most part” applies). In such cases a couple of applicable warrants, instead of only one, are 
provided by Aristotle pointing to diverging weighing results. Here are some examples 
consecutively mentioned in the text (1364a 24-31): 
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And that which is scarcer is a greater good than that which is abundant, as gold 
than iron, although it is less useful, but the possession of it is more valuable, since 
it is more difficult of acquisition. From another point of view, that which is 
abundant is to be preferred to that which is scarce, because the use of it is greater, 
for “often” exceeds “seldom”; whence the saying: “Water is best”.6 And, speaking 
generally [hōlos], that which is more difficult is preferable to that which is easier 
of attainment, for it is scarcer; but from another point of view that which is easier 
is preferable to that which is more difficult; for its nature is as we wish. 
 
According to Aristotle, in fact, scarcity and its opposite, abundance, may both primarily support 
the goodness of an aim. So can both easy and difficult attainability. What the author is telling us 
here is that the orators may and will use these criteria variously and look, in each case, for the 
warrants supporting their choice. The opposite examples given in the text in which Gold, as a 
desirable good, is weighed (advantageously) against Iron and then (disadvantageously) against 
Water might be diagrammed thus, with the explicit warrants provided by Aristotle supporting the 
balance: 
 
Argumentation in favour of the greater goodness of Gold over Iron 
 
 Gold is scarcer than iron  
That which 
is scarcer is 
a greater 
good than 
that which is 
abundant: 
So 
 
 Gold 
is scarce 
   Iron is 
abundant 
 
The 
possession of 
scarce 
minerals is 
valuable: 
So 
 
>  So 
An 
abundant 
mineral is 
extensively 
useful: 
 Gold is a 
good 
Conquering 
Persia will 
bring us gold 
 Commerce 
with Hesperia 
will bring us 
iron  
Iron is a good 
 
What brings 
us some good 
should be 
done: 
So 
 
So 
What brings 
us some 
good should 
be done: 
 I propose we conquer Persia  I propose we try to commerce 
with Hesperia 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Pindar, Olympian I.1-2: “Water is best, and gold, like a blazing fire in the night, stands out supreme of all lordly 
wealth” 
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Argumentation in favour of the greater goodness of Water over Gold 
 
 Pindar attests to the high esteem of abundance in his verse:  
“Water is best” 
 
Poets and 
men of repute 
may act as 
“witnesses” 
(1375b): 
So 
 
 Often exceeds seldom:  
 So  
 Gold 
is scarce 
   Water is 
abundant 
 
The 
possession of 
scarce 
minerals is 
valuable: 
So 
 
<  So 
What is  
abundant 
might be 
extensively 
beneficial: 
 Gold is a 
good 
Conquering 
Persia will 
bring us gold 
 Building an 
aqueduct will 
provide the 
city water 
Water is a 
good  
What brings 
us some good 
should be 
done: 
So 
 
So 
What brings 
us some 
good should 
be done: 
 I propose we conquer Persia  I propose we build an aqueduct  
 
As we see, such warrants might be pieces of received wisdom, reputed opinions (endoxa), in 
many cases qualified by the expression “generally speaking” (hōlos), proverbs, well-known 
verses or sayings by “poets and men of repute” (cf. 1375b 27ff, about recent and ancient 
“witnesses”). But also (in Aristotle’s case, at least, although probably less so in the citizens’ 
assembly) quasi-logical or semantic relationships as, for example: “whenever one class surpasses 
another, the greatest of that class will surpass the greatest of the other” (1363b 22). The 
inventory is as miscellaneous as the much better-known list of general topics in Book II, chap. 23 
(cf. Braet, 2005; Olmos, 2016). 
Some of them reveal particularly interesting features, expressing common and 
contradictory ways of using a pair of opposing terms. The already mentioned case of “easy and 
difficult attainability” is less developed by the author than the related opposition between 
abundance and scarcity, the text just referring to it in a cursory way. The facts, though, that  
 
a) these particular notions relate to commonly conceivable reasons to support the 
eligibility and “expediency” of an action and that  
b) the supposedly positive one (i.e. “easy to accomplish” or rhaidion) is also 
mentioned in the Rhetoric to Alexander  
 
might help us see the great distance between Anaximenes’ somewhat naive and Aristotle’s more 
sophisticated (and realistic) approach to these matters. 
Anaximenes, the supposed author of the Rhetoric to Alexander, assumes that “rhaidion” 
is always going to be a positive reason to support an action in a practical argument, thus: 
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 Action A is easy to accomplish 
Easy actions are eligible on account of 
that quality: 
So 
 I propose we do A 
 
He admits though, that this is no absolute matter. Sometimes, difficult actions are advocated in 
spite of such quality by adducing that they are at least “feasible” (dynaton) or even “necessary” 
(anankes). He is contemplating here the most basic level of meta-argumentation: the one 
represented and expressed by the argumentative connective “but”. 
 
 Action A is not 
easy to 
accomplish 
 Action A is 
necessary 
 
Actions are 
eligible on account 
of their being easy 
to accomplish: 
So 
BUT 
< 
So 
Actions are eligible 
on account of their  
being necessary: 
 I propose we do 
not do A 
 I propose we 
do A 
 
 
However Aristotle does admit of more possibilities (in fact he mentions first the one not 
contemplated by Anaximenes). And this reveals his consciousness about the ductile quality of 
our practice of giving reasons.  
Let’s read again the fragment: “And speaking generally [hōlos] that which is more 
difficult is preferable to that which is easier of attainment, for it is scarcer”. This means, he is 
willing to admit the prima facie applicability (however limited) of a warrant such as “actions are 
eligible on account of their being difficult to accomplish” and even defend its meta-
argumentative priority over the opposed warrant (“actions are eligible on account of their being 
easy to accomplish”) based on a new allegation which Aristotle simply puts as “for it is scarcer”, 
plausibly referring to the higher value and fame attached to demanding tasks. 
 
Difficult actions are scarcer than easy ones 
So 
 Action A is 
difficult to 
accomplish 
> 
Action B is 
easy to 
accomplish 
 
Actions are 
eligible on account 
of their being 
difficult to 
accomplish: 
So  So 
Actions are eligible 
on account of their  
being easy to 
accomplish: 
 I propose we do 
A 
 I propose we do 
B 
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“But,” he continues, “from another point of view, that which is easier is preferable to that which 
is more difficult; for its nature is as we wish”. And this means, we may meta-argue, weighing the 
reasons with the opposite result: 
 
The nature of easy actions is as we wish 
So 
 Action A is 
difficult to 
accomplish 
< 
Action B is 
easy to 
accomplish 
 
Actions are 
eligible on account 
of their being 
difficult to 
accomplish: 
So  So 
Actions are eligible 
on account of their  
being easy to 
accomplish: 
 I propose we do 
A 
 I propose we do 
B 
 
 
The availability, within our inventory of “practical wisdom”, of plausible and usable “conflicting 
warrants” attests to the problems of value diversity and value pluralism as defined by Kock 
(2007). The availability, again, of additional maxims that embody ways and reason to justify our 
choice in case of conflict, reveal that we do not stop at an apparent situation of value 
incommensurability, but continue arguing and meta-arguing. However, we must realize that these 
additional maxims also have their conflicting counter-maxims that support the opposite weighing 
or balance of reasons. And this is all legitimate as long as we assume that we are not in a domain 
allowing or even requiring demonstrations. The better case will be contextually decided upon by 
the audience and still be subject to reconsiderations.  
Probably the best confirmation that Aristotle was rather more sensible than could have 
been expected to all these complications (using his own terms and focuses, of course) is one of 
the examples given in this same part of the Rhetoric. When examining, in particular, the way 
orators may make use of such notions as “principle” (archē) and “end” (telos) to support the kind 
of comparative meta-arguments he has in mind, the author offers us the following account, 
including a rather paradoxical (or cynical) example that brings us to the context of the judicial 
genre: 
 
It is clear then, from what has been said, that a thing may be greater in two ways; 
for if it is a first principle but another is not, it will appear to be greater, and if it is 
not a first principle [but an end], while another is; for the end is greater and not a 
first principle. Thus, Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, declared that the man 
who had given the advice was more guilty than the one who carried it out; for if 
he had not suggested it, it could not have been carried out. And conversely, when 
accusing Chabrias, he declared that the man who had carried out the advice was 
more guilty than the one who had given it; for it could not have been carried out, 
had there not been some one to do so, and the reason why people devised plots 
was that others might carry them out. (1364a 15ff) 
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In this somewhat different but also practical and civic context the action in search of justification 
is a judicial decision for whose concretion, in one sense or another, the attorney (Leodamas, in 
this case) would plead. Leodamas’ paraxodical double plea, apparently made in a single trial, as 
exposed by Aristotle could be represented by the following twin diagrams: 
 
 
Argumentation in favour of the greater guilt of Callistratus 
If he had not suggested it, it could not have been carried out 
So 
The man who gave the advice is more guilty than the one who carried it out 
So 
 Callistratus 
advised 
Chabrias  
 
 
  Chabrias 
acted on 
Callistratus’ 
advice 
 
Advice acts 
as a principle 
for action: 
So 
   
So 
Implementation 
is the end of 
advice: 
 Callistratus 
was the 
principle of 
the crime 
A guilty 
verdict 
befits 
Callistratus’ 
participation 
> 
A guilty 
verdict 
befits 
Chabrias’ 
participation 
Chabrias 
carried out 
the crime 
  
 
The judge 
sentences 
according to 
defendant’s 
responsibility: 
So 
 
 
 
So 
The judge 
sentences 
according to 
defendant’s 
responsibility: 
 I ask the judge to condemn 
Callistratus 
 I ask the judge to condemn 
Chabrias 
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Argumentation in favour of the greater guilt of Chabrias 
 It could not have been carried out, had there not been some one to do so 
The reason 
why people 
devise plots 
is that 
others 
might carry 
them out: 
So 
 The man who carried out the advice is more guilty than the one who gave it 
 So 
  Callistratus 
advised 
Chabrias  
 
 
  Chabrias 
acted on 
Callistratus’ 
advice 
 
 Advice acts as 
a principle for 
action: 
So 
   
So 
Implementation 
is the end of 
advice: 
  Callistratus 
was the 
principle of 
the crime 
A guilty 
verdict befits 
Callistratus’ 
participation 
< 
A guilty 
verdict befits 
Chabrias’ 
participation 
Chabrias 
carried 
out 
the crime 
  
 
 The judge 
sentences 
according to 
defendant’s 
responsibility: 
So 
 
So 
The judge 
sentences 
according to 
defendant’s 
responsibility: 
  I ask the judge to condemn 
Callistratus 
 I ask the judge to 
condemn Chabrias 
 
 
This probably “mythical”, though thoroughly Greek in spirit, example reminds us of the well-
known anecdote about the founding fathers of the rhetorical art, Tisias and Corax, and their 
paradoxical ways of pleading against each other (Schiappa, 1999). But here the attorney is just 
one and he has supposedly used both contradicting ways to weigh the relative guilt of the two 
defendants in a single trial. What this tells us about Leodamas as a cunning attorney is not my 
focus here, but what it tells us about Aristotle as an argumentation theorist is. He just states that 
both are usable, indeed used, ways of arguing and weighing arguments and he does not try to say 
which is better or more rational in absolute terms. 
So, even acknowledging the usefulness of meta-argumentation to start trying to overcome 
problems of prima facie incommensurability and “fierce standoffs” problematic and debatable 
issues remain problematic and debatable and permanently reevaluable, as we experience every 
day.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This revision of some chapters of Aristotle’s Rhetoric shows his consciousness about the 
argumentative peculiarities and evaluative difficulties of deliberative arguments supporting 
collective proposals. As we have seen, Aristotle naturally assumes that, in such an argumentative 
field, the continuum between argument and argument criticism, taking generally the form of 
meta-argumentation, is going to be prevalent, among other things due to the exceptionable and 
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debatable character of almost any piece of “practical wisdom” he can think of. Book I, 1359a30-
1366a22, reveals not just the well-known value-laden multidimensionality of arguments aiming 
at supporting “what’s advisable” (emphasized by Kock, 2006; 2012), but an almost inescapable 
multi-level-multidimensionality as it is here, more than in any other part of the Rhetoric, that 
Aristotle feels compelled to engage in listing topics and criteria (idia) for explicitly comparative 
meta-argumentation (1363b5-1365b20).  
Now, even if his search for meta-criteria yields not a definitive evaluative scale for value-
laden argumentation (in my opinion that would be a symptom of its being wrong), it shows us 
ways to continue our discussion, which is one rational thing to do when and if we have room for 
it.  
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